I attempt an explication of what it means for an operation across domains to be the same on all domains, an issue that Feferman (1999) took to be central for a successful delimitation of the logical operations. Some properties that seem strongly related to sameness are examined, notably isomorphism invariance, and sameness under extensions of the domain. The conclusion is that although no precise criterion can satisfy all intuitions about sameness, combining the two properties just mentioned yields a reasonably robust and useful explication of sameness across domains.
Introduction
In three fairly recent papers, Sol Feferman discussed the question of logicality, of what makes some symbols logical and others not. 1 Driven by a "personal feeling that the logical operations do not go beyond those represented in FOL" (Feferman, 2010) , he explored different ways of characterizing logicality, starting with his analysis and critique of the Tarski-Sher thesis. Tarski's invariance criterion, from Tarski (1986) , was that logical notions are those which are permutation invariant; a property I will call Perm. Sher (1991) strengthened the requirement to isomorphism invariance (Isom). 2 While granting that Isom is * Sol Feferman was an inspiration to me for most of my adult life and, for almost as long, a friend. I'm delighted to have been asked to contribute to this volume in his honor. As to the paper, thanks to Lauri Hella and Jouko Väänänen for helpful conversations on the modeltheoretic parts, and to Stanley Peters who saved me from a rather embarrassing mistake (remaining ones are mine, of course). I also want to thank the two extremely encouraging and patient editors of this volume. 1 Feferman (1999 1 Feferman ( , 2010 1 Feferman ( , 2015 .
2 Thereby avoiding to treat as logical, for example, an operator which behaves as the universal quantifier on universes containing the number 0, and as the existential quantifier on other universes. Also, Sher restricted attention to operations of type level at most 2, and Feferman in general follows this restriction. a necessary feature of logical constants, Feferman argued that it is far from sufficient, and suggested several stronger criteria that essentially narrow down the range of logical constants to those definable in FOL.
In this note I focus on just one part of his critique of the Tarski-Sher thesis. In Feferman (1999) , he thought of this as "perhaps the strongest reason for rejecting the Tarski-Sher thesis", and formulated it as follows: "No natural explanation is given by it of what constitutes the same logical operation over arbitrary basic domains".
Let us call this criterion Same. For a basic domain M , let M be a typed universe over M , relative to some suitable type system. We are considering operations across domains, i.e. operations O that with each M associate an object O M ∈ M of a given type.
The question, of course, is what "same operation" should mean, and indeed if it is possible to give it a "natural explanation". The notion might seem inherently vague. There are, however, a number of fairly strong intuitions about Same, so let us start with these.
Some intuitions
Feferman used an example from McGee of an operation across domains that clearly does not satisfy Same: "a logical connective which acts like disjunction when the size of the domain is an even successor cardinal, like conjunction when the size of the domain is an odd successor cardinal, and like a biconditional at limits" (McGee, 1996) :577. There are plenty of other, and simpler, examples in the same vein, for example, a quantifier which acts like ∀ on universes with at least 100 elements, and as ∃ on smaller universes. Thus:
There are numerous examples of operations across universes that behave differently on different universes, and therefore do not satisfy Same.
From the examples illustrating (I1) it seems uncontroversial that Isom does not imply Same. Perhaps a slightly more debatable question is if the implication in the other direction holds. But if h is an bijection from M to M , and hence lifts to a bijection from each M τ to M τ (see section 3), it seems to me like a very reasonable requirement of sameness that an operation O M should map along h to the corresponding operation on M τ , that is, that h(O M ) = O h(M ) , which is precisely what Isom says. So I think the following intuition is quite strong too.
(I2)
Operations satisfying Same also satisfy Isom.
Note that (I2) does not derive from the standard thought that Isom captures topic neutrality, and therefore is a necessary feature of logicality. Rather, we are simply using the idea that isomorphic models have, in the strictest sense, the same structure.
Our next intuition about sameness is something practically everyone would agree to:
The (interpretations of the) usual first-order symbols ∀, ∃, ¬, ∧, ∨, → satisfy Same.
There is a simple but important lesson to be drawn from (I1) and (I3):
(1) The class of Same operations is not closed under definability (even firstorder definability).
Now one might think this already disqualifies the Same notion from playing any significant part in characterizing logicality. Indeed, the role of definability for the notion of logicality is itself an interesting and intricate issue, discussed in McGee (1996 ), Feferman (1999 , 2010 , Bonnay (2008) , and recently, from a general model-theoretic perspective, in Bonnay and Engström (2016) .
But that issue is not the topic of the present note. My aim is just to see what sense can be made of Same. I conclude from (1) that if there is a precise version of this idea, then its role for the notion of logicality would at most be as a requirement on primitive logical constants, not defined ones.
Before moving on, we should note that Feferman (1999) proposed to implement Same (at least partly) by strengthening Isom to Hom: invariance under homomorphisms. He proved that the operations definable in first-order logic without equality are precisely those definable from monadic operations across domains satisfying Hom. Granted that Hom is accepted, this of course contradicts (1).
Later, however, Feferman abandoned Hom as a criterion of logicality, not (at least not explicitly) for reasons related to Same, but rather because (a) equality does not satisfy Hom, and (b) the restriction to monadic types seems rather arbitrary, and once you admit operations of non-monadic types, a host of non-first-order operations become definable; indeed, as Bonnay (2008) showed, the Hom operations of arbitrary type are exactly those definable in L ∞∞ without equality (which, as Feferman points out, for a language with finitely many predicate symbols, has essentially the same expressive power as full L ∞∞ ).
It also seems to me that Hom has a serious problem with Same. It requires invariance even when you shrink the universe (homomorphically) to a single point. But, just to take an example, couldn't it be that the action of an operation across domains, say, on some set arguments, essentially depends on whether these are disjoint or not? Such dependencies will get lost if the domain is shrunk enough. It would at least require some independent argument, I think, to disqualify such operations from the start, which is what Hom does. For these reasons, I will ignore Hom in what follows, and maintain that (1) is a feature of the notion of sameness we are after.
3 Types and quantifiers I restrict attention, in much of what follows, to the operations on domains usually called (generalized or Lindström) quantifiers. This is because intuitions, and facts, are simpler for quantifiers, or more generally for operations of type level ≤ 2. Eventually, of course, one would like to be able to deal with operations of all types.
The type system used in Feferman (1999) , let us call it TFT, is (with slight notational differences) as follows: e, t are basic type symbols, complex types symbols have the form σ 1 . . . For many purposes, relational types are somewhat simpler to deal with. Every type symbol τ in TFT can be uniquely written as
where τ 0 is either e or t. Following van Benthem (1989) , call τ individual if τ 0 = e and Boolean if τ 0 = t. Boolean types are relational but their arguments need not be; cf. e, e , t . Define the strictly relational types of TFT inductively as follows:
τ is strictly relational iff τ is either basic or of the form σ 1 . . . σ n , t , where each σ i is strictly relational. (e is included for convenience here.)
For these types, a simpler relational type system, call it RT, is the following: the only basic type symbol is e, and complex type symbols have the form (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ). Given M , M e = M , and M (σ1,...,σn) = P(M σ1 × · · · × M σn ). 3 Then it is easy to verify that RT is isomorphic to the strictly relational part of TFT, and that operations across domains in this part of TFT transfer in an obvious way to operations across domains in RT, and vice versa.
Finally, for (generalized) quantifiers, there is the widely used type notation from Lindström (1966) ; we can extend it slightly to include 0-ary relations (i.e. truth values) as arguments, so that propositional connectives are quantifiers too. Thus, a quantifier of type k 1 , . . . , k n (where each k i ≥ 0) is an operation Q across domains such that, for each M , Q M is an n-ary relation between relations over M , of arities k 1 , . . . , k n , respectively. 4 For example, if Q is of type 1, 0, 3 , then Q M relates a subset of M , a truth value, and a subset of M 3 . A binary propositional connective like ∧ has type 0, 0 ; here we can think of ∧ M as the usual truth function (which is independent of M ). 5 A quantifier of type 3 Stipulating that the cartesian product of the empty sequence () of sets is {∅}, we have M () = P({∅}) = {∅{∅}} = {0, 1}, so () corresponds to the type t in TFT.
4 If πm is the TFT type symbol e m , t of m-ary relations between individuals (and π 0 = t), type k 1 , . . . , kn corresponds to π k 1 . . . π kn , t . Similarly in RT, it corresponds to ((e k 1 ), . . . , (e kn )). 5 I am using the same notation for the conjunction symbol and its interpretation (its corresponding quantifier), and similarly later on for other quantifier symbols; this should not generate confusion. k 1 , . . . , k n is (pure) monadic, if each k i is ≤ 1 (is = 1).
In familiar notation, L(Q, Q , . . .) is first-order logic (FOL) with added quantifiers Q, Q , . . .: for each quantifier one adds a corresponding variable-binding operator of the same type, and extends the syntax and the definition of satisfaction accordingly; details can be found in any textbook or survey paper dealing with generalized quantifiers. For logics L and L , L ≤ L means that every L-sentence is equivalent to (has the same models as) some L -sentence, L ≡ L means that L ≤ L and L ≤ L, and L < L means that L ≤ L and L ≤ L.
In logic, one generally requires Q, Q , . . . to satisfy Isom, which has the effect that L(Q, Q , . . .)-sentences preserve their truth value across isomorphic models. This is of course consonant with intuition (I2).
Extension and a clash of intuitions
A serious candidate for a precise notion of sameness is the property of Extension (Ext), introduced by van Benthem. 6 For quantifiers it is the following condition:
Indeed, this generalizes to all types in RT:
The reason this works is that types in RT are monotone in the following sense:
(2)
If τ is an RT-type and M ⊆ M , then M τ ⊆ M τ .
(2) is in stark contrast to TFT types: 7
This is the main reason it is more problematic to define a natural version of Ext for arbitrary TFT-types. As far as I know, van Benthem did not explicitly connect Ext to the Same idea; that connection is discussed extensively in Peters and Westerståhl (2006) , Ch. 3.4-5. But surely Ext is in itself a very strong notion of sameness across domains. It says that only the elements of M belonging to some tuple in some R i matter for the truth value of the statement Q M (R 1 , . . . , R n ). Extending the universe beyond that has no effect: the operation remains the 'same'. More
Here is a different formulation of essentially the same notion. The quantifiers Q of type k 1 , . . . , k n we are interested in are usually definable in standard set theories, like ZF. That is, Q can be introduced by a ZF-formula ψ(M, R) with at most the free variables M, R, a definition of Q, such that
Then:
(4)
A definable quantifier Q is Ext iff it has a definition in which the variable M does not occur.
Proof. If Q has such a definition, it is immediate that Ext holds. Conversely, suppose Q is Ext, and defined by ψ(M, R). We have
Thus, Q M (R) ⇔ ψ(field(R), R), and the right-hand side can be written as a ZF-formula where at most the variables R occur. 2
Thus, the following is a strong intuition about sameness:
But now we have a clash of intuitions: (I2) and (I4) are incompatible! For if both were true, it would follow that Ext implies Isom, which is manifestly not the case. Many Ext quantifiers, such as the so-called Montagovian individuals (I a ) M (B) ⇔ a ∈ B, and quantified noun phrase denotations like (most student ) M (B) ⇔ |student ∩ B| > |student − B|, where a is a fixed individual and student a fixed set, are Ext but not Isom.
It is not surprising -in fact, I think it is inevitable -that some intuitions about sameness clash. In the case of (I2) and (I4), we have already seen that they are based on quite different ideas about sameness. I will come back to the question of what we should conclude from this, but for now, in this and the next section, I take a closer look at the status of Ext in the literature. To begin, here are some sample facts : f. The Rescher quantifier Q R and the Chang quantifier
g. Under Ext, Perm is equivalent to Isom, for all operations across domains of relational type.
As to (5-a), note that we are talking about propositional negation. Predicate negation is of type e, t , e, t , which is not relational. Together with (I3); (5-c) and (5-f) indicate that the converse of (I4) fails, at least if these quantifiers are taken to satisfy Same. Regarding (5-e), it seems a rather reasonable assumption that the class of Same quantifiers (in any type) is also closed under boolean operations. But note that certain types of quantifiers also have a natural notion of inner negation. For example, in type 1, 1 , we define
. Clearly, Ext is not preserved under inner negation. In general, the class of Ext quantifiers is not closed under (firstorder) definability, since e.g. ∀ is definable from ∃ and ¬. (5-g), finally, requires a small (but straightforward) argument, not given here.
I discuss Ext in connection with other quantifiers from mathematical logic in the next section, but let me end this section with some remarks on the role of Ext in formal semantics for natural language. Noun phrases, like Mary, the tallest man on earth, most students, every professor, can be taken to denote type 1 quantifiers, and determiners, like every, some, most, at most ten, infinitely many, to denote type 1, 1 quantifiers. For example,
9 In the literature, the label 'Rescher quantifier' is often used for a stronger quantifier of type 1, 1 , let us call it more, where more M (A, B) ⇔ |A| > |B| (which, incidentally, is Ext). (For example, the survey article Mundici (1985) uses 'Q R ' for more.) My usage here is historically more accurate, since precisely the type 1 quantifier Q R was introduced in the abstract Rescher (1962) . Rescher also mentioned the relativization of Q R , which is the quantifier most, defined by most M (A, B) ⇔ |A ∩ B| > |A − B|; most is strictly stronger than Q R , but strictly weaker than more; see, for example, Peters and Westerståhl (2006) , Ch. 14.3. Now it seems to be a linguistic fact that all determiner denotations, i.e. all type 1, 1 quantifiers that interpret natural language determiners, are Ext. An explanation for this is that determiners serve to restrict the domain of quantification to the first (noun) argument, and this enforces Ext. 10 In fact, the Ext property is ubiquitous in natural language. The nonmonadic quantifiers that feature in the interpretation of linguistic constructions such as reciprocals, branching, cumulative quantification, possessives, etc., are all Ext; see Peters and Westerståhl (2006) for examples and discussion. Likewise, almost all type 1 noun phrase denotations satisfy Ext; in particular, all denotations of restricted noun phrases of the form [determiner + noun], when the noun has a fixed interpretation (most students, every professor ).
Indeed, the only exceptions seem to be certain noun phrases containing a word, such as the English thing, which can be taken to denote the universe. Thus, the denotations of everything, most things, all but five things, are not Ext. 11 Since every, most, all but five, are all Ext, it seems that the 'blame' for this state of affairs must be placed on words like thing; more on this in section 6 below.
Mathematical quantifiers and Ext
A quick survey of quantifiers discussed in model theory -for example, as presented in Mundici (1985) -reveals that many of them are Ext, but some are not. We shall look at just a few examples. The interest of these quantifiers lies in the model-theoretic properties of the corresponding logics, such as varying degrees of compactness, Löwenheim-Skolem properties, etc. But here the task is just to assess the status of Ext in a model-theoretic context.
We have already encountered Q R and Q C as non-Ext quantifiers. Cardinality quantifiers (∃ ≥ℵα and variants), and cardinality comparison quantifiers like the Härtig quantifier (I M (A, B) ⇔ |A| = |B|) and more M (A, B) ⇔ |A| > |B| (see note 9), are Ext.
The Magidor-Malitz quantifiers Q n κ , defined, for R ⊆ M n , by
are Ext, and so are the related Ramsey quantifiers, a typical variant of which is defined as follows: for Q of type 1, 1 , A ⊆ M , and R ⊆ M n , let
Now consider partially ordered quantifiers, i.e. quantifiers that express nonlinearly ordered prefixes of ∀x and ∃y. For most purposes, it suffices to consider the Henkin prefix ∀x ∃x ∀y ∃y ψ(x, x , y, y )
This expresses the type 4 Henkin quantifier Q H , defined by
But this is 'made up for' by the fact that Q H relativizes.
To explain this, recall that for any quantifier Q of type k 1 , . . . , k n , the relativization Q rel of Q is the type 1, k 1 , . . . , k n quantifier defined by
A quantifier is relativized if it is equal to Q rel for some Q, and we say that Q relativizes if Q rel is definable in L(Q). (Note that it is always the case that Q is definable in L(Q rel .) Now, Q H relativizes, since it is easy to check that (Q H ) rel is expressible by the following L(Q H )-sentence:
We will get back to what this has to do with Ext, but first we consider another group of familiar quantifiers.
Order quantifiers express properties of a (usually linear) order relation R, for example, that R is a well-order, or is dense and contains a countable dense subset, or has cofinality ω, or is isomorphic to some given ordered set. Other order quantifiers compare two order relations, R and S, saying, for example, that they are isomorphic.
Two things are striking (from our perspective) about the discussion of these quantifiers in the literature. First, R is sometimes taken to be an ordering of the universe, and sometimes just an ordering of its field. In the former case, the quantifier is not Ext; in the latter, it usually is. Second, not much attention is paid to this difference, apparently since it usually doesn't matter for the relevant model-theoretic facts which version is chosen. Let us see what the general situation is.
Given any quantifier Q of type k 1 , . . . , k n , we obtain a 'universal version' Q uni of the same type:
Now, Q uni is practically never Ext:
If Q uni is not the trivial quantifier 0, then Q uni is not Ext.
In the cases mentioned above, the (non-Ext) order quantifiers saying of the universe that R is a well-order of it, or an order of a given order type, or dense with a countable dense subset, or has cofinality ω, all have the form Q uni , where Q is Ext and says the same thing about the field of R. Similarly for the isomorphism quantifier.
The following general facts hold about Ext and the expressive power of Q, Q rel , and Q uni .
Proposition 1
Let L be a logic and Q a quantifier of type k 1 , . . . , k n . 12 (a) Relativized quantifiers satisfy Ext.
Proof. (a): This is immediate from the definition of relativization.
. This condition is expressed in L(Q) by the sentence (where x i = x i1 . . . x iki , A interprets P , and R i interprets P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n):
Qx 1 , . . . , x n ((P 1 x 1 ∧ k1 j=1 P x 1j ), . . . , (P n x n ∧ kn j=1 P x nj )) (c): We first observe that, for A ⊆ M ,
This shows that L((Q uni ) rel ) ≤ L(Q). Moreover, for the special case A = field(R), we obtain which shows that L(Q) ≤ L((Q uni ) rel ).
The second claim in (c) follows from the first: The left-to-right direction holds trivially because Q uni is definable in L(Q), and the other direction follows using this easy folklore fact:
2 By (a) of the proposition, for quantifiers like Q H that are not Ext but still relativize, we can, if required, 'pretend' they are Ext, by using their relativizations instead, which do satisfy Ext and have the same expressive power. 14 This doesn't work for order quantifiers of the form Q uni , since they these quantifiers usually do not relativize, even though Q is Ext and hence relativizes. 15 But by (c) of the proposition, Q and Q uni still do not differ with respect to definability in many common logics. For example, the quantifier 'R is a well-order of the universe' is definable in L ω1ω1 , by conjoining the order axioms with the sentence
Since L ω1ω1 relativizes, it follows that the stronger quantifier 'R is a well-order of its field' is also definable in L ω1ω1 . 16 Finally, let us get back to the (pure) monadic quantifiers. If Q is of type 1, . . . , 1 , then
Although Proposition 1 still applies, part (c) has no interest, since in general, Q uni has no interesting connection to Q. For example, ∀ uni = ∃ uni = (Q R ) uni = ∀, (¬∃) uni = (¬Q R ) uni = 0. Similarly, (all uni ) M (A, B) ⇔ B = M . The latter quantifier is neither Ext nor Conserv (note 10), and in a natural language (or any other?) context there seems to be no reason to consider it.
Summing up then, it seems fair to say that failure of Ext usually plays no significant role for generalized quantifiers studied in mathematical logic. Many of these quantifiers already satisfy Ext. Among the ones that don't, some, 14 Q H essentially involves the whole universe, which is reflected in the fact that (Q H ) uni = Q H . 15 I have not attempted a general statement and proof of this fact here, but intuitively it should be fairly clear. Consider, for example, WO uni , where WO M (R) says that R is a well-ordering of its field. Let η be the order type of the rationals, and let M = (M, A, R) be a model where R is a linear order of M with the order type η + ω + η and A is the subset corresponding to ω, and let M = (M , A , R ) be a similar model, but where R has the order type η + ω + ω * + ω + η, and A corresponds to ω + ω * + ω. like the Henkin quantifier, relativize, and thus it doesn't matter if one uses them or their relativized versions which do satisfy Ext, since they have the same expressive power. As to the group of order quantifiers, the (non-Ext) version describing properties of orders of the whole universe is usually strictly weaker than the (Ext) version where only the field of the relation is ordered.
Here we have seen that, as regards definability in logics that themselves allow relativization, the difference between the two versions disappears. Of course, this does not show that this difference is irrelevant to other model-theoretic properties of these quantifiers that have been studied. Still, my claim would be that usually, when the weaker version is used, this is because it slightly simplifies certain arguments, but these arguments can easily be adapted to the stronger version as well.
Remark: I am not aware of any study of this issue in the literature. Restricting attention to the property of compactness, here are three examples: (1) The well-order quantifier WO (note 15) is such that neither L(WO) nor L(WO uni ) is compact. (2) The cofinality quantifier Q cf ω , says of a linear order that it has cofinality ω in its field. Shelah (1975) showed that L(Q cf ω ) is fully compact, but, for example, the proof in Väänänen (2011) uses (Q cf ω ) uni instead. But the result about L((Q cf ω ) uni ) is only apparently weaker, since the proof is easily adjusted to deal with the stronger quantifier. (3) Let (Q D ) M (R) ⇔ R is a dense linear ordering of its field with a countable dense subset. Then L(Q D ) is countably compact, and hence, so is L((Q D ) uni ). Indeed, the same proof of compactness can be given in both cases, by translation into stationary logic L(aa), which is countably compact; see Mundici (1985) . 17 End of remark.
The situation is similar for monadic quantifiers, even though the version which requires the quantifier to 'act' on the whole universe is usually totally uninteresting. Here, the only non-Ext monadic quantifiers in the model-theoretic literature that I know of are of type 1 , notably Q R , Q C , and of course ∀ (and variants such as (∃ ≥n )¬, etc.). ∀ relativizes (as does its variants), so one can just as well use ∀ rel = all. But Q R and Q C do not. Further, neither L(Q R ) nor L(Q C ) is compact; in each there is a sentence with arbitrarily large finite models but no infinite model. Both logics satisfy an upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, hence none of them can characterize (ω, <), but it is not hard to show that this structure can be characterized in both L((Q R ) rel ) = L(most) and L((Q C ) rel ). 18
'thing'
I said that the only thing that seems to lead to violations of Ext in a natural language context are words like the English 'thing'. This word arguably denotes an operation across domains, which we may call a unary predicate, of relational type (e), defined by
We note that thing itself is Perm and Ext (and hence Isom, by (5-g)). Indeed, let the unary predicate empty be defined by empty M = ∅ for all M . Then we have:
The only unary predicates satisfying Perm and Ext are thing and empty.
This is a special case of a more general fact.
Proposition 2 ( (Westerståhl, 1985) ) The operations O across domains of relational type (e n ) that satisfy Perm and Ext are exactly the ones that are first-order definable without parameters by Boolean combinations of formulas of the form x i = x j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
A typical example of type (e 3 ) would be
which is defined in pure first-order logic with identity by the formula
Getting back to the unary case, if we count empty as trivial, we can say that thing is the only non-trivial logical unary predicate. 19 Even though it 'refers to the universe' in an obvious sense, it satisfies Ext and therefore, at least according to (I4), Same.
In natural language semantics, it appears that all instances of non-Ext operations across domains arise from replacing a fixed predicate, such as students in most students, with thing: most things = Q R . Curiously, thing itself is Ext, as is of course most. This kind of replacement doesn't always destroy Ext: for example, from at least ten students we get at least ten things = ∃ ≥10 . It can be shown that preservation of Ext holds precisely when the determiner denotation in question is symmetric, in the sense that Q M (A, B) implies Q M (B, A) for all M and all A, B ⊆ M . 20 More generally, if we in a relativized quantifier of type 1, k 1 , . . . , k n (which is always Ext) replace the first argument by thing, we obtain the original quantifier (which may or may not be Ext). 19 Barwise and Cooper (1981) use thing as a logical constant in their formal language. 20 Provided Q is Conserv and Ext (see Peters and Westerståhl (2006) , Ch. 6.1).
Taking stock
After these observations about Ext, we can get back to Same. As we saw in section 2, the strongest intuitive cases of non-Same quantifiers are those where Q 'behaves differently' on different M . Here are some more examples. Define (for all M = ∅)
In other words (for all A ⊆ M ),
This seems like a clear case: ∀even does not satisfy Same. But what about the following two test cases (restricting attention to finite universes)?
There is a strong inclination to treat test1 and test2 on a par: either both satisfy Same or both don't; the difference between them seems minimal. And guided by the clear case of ∀even, we may think the latter option is most reasonable. But now we have another clash of intuitions. We have so far assumed that Q R satisfies Same, but, in fact, test1 = Q R (on finite universes)! So what shall we do: say that test1 but not test2 satisfies Same, or that both do (but ∀even does not), or that none of them does?
We will see below that, for quantifiers of this particular kind, there is in fact a principled way to count test1 and ∀, but not test2 or ∀even, among the quantifiers that behave 'the same' on all universes. However, for arbitrary quantifiers and more generally for operations across universes of arbitrary types, I think the example just reinforces the conclusion we have already drawn: there simply is no precise demarcation of the quantifiers, let alone the general operations across domains, that accords with all of our intuitions about sameness.
One might object that there could a be a vague criterion that fits most of our intuitions: there would then be clear cases of operations that satisfy the criterion, and clear cases that don't, but there would also be borderline cases where we don't know exactly what to say. This may well be the case. But, first, so far there is no specification of such a criterion that goes beyond the basic intuitions we have discussed in this note. Second, and more importantly, our goal was precisely to replace this vague notion by an exact criterion. My contention, then, is that it is not possible, in this way, to be faithful to all of those intuitions.
Certainly, this is not something I have demonstrated; presumably, it is not something that could be demonstrated. But cases analogous to test1 and test2 can be constructed ad libitum. More generally, along the lines above one can generate sequences Q 1 , . . . , Q n of quantifiers such that the difference between each Q i and Q i+1 seems so small that they should not differ with respect to sameness, but where Q 1 is a familiar quantifier normally thought of as being the same across different domains, whereas Q n is an 'artifical' quantifier without that property. Similarly, we saw that the intuitions behind (I2) concerning Isom and the intuitions behind (I4) concerning Ext, if taken to hold unrestrictedly, are at odds with each other.
A proposal
The conclusion just reached may seem disappointing. But we can end on a more positive note. The situation is precisely of a kind, I think, where a Carnapian explication is called for. In the present case, here is a proposal:
In other words, stipulate that the conjunction of one necessary -on one intuition -and one sufficient -on another intuition -condition for sameness together constitute a necessary and sufficient condition. 21 Isom says that the operation across domains is preserved under structure-preserving maps. Ext says that the part of the domain which is outside the arguments of the operation never matters. Let's require both.
This means, in effect, that we keep (I2) but reject (I4). It also means that, for example, ∀ is does not satisfy Same. As I have argued, effects of this kind cannot be avoided.
A proposal like this is not right or wrong, but more or less fruitful. To evaluate it, one needs to look at its consequences, which is essentially what I have done in this note. First, it entails that sameness is not closed under (firstorder) definability, but we already accepted that. It is closed, however, under the usual Boolean operations.
Second, many operations, in particular quantifiers, that seem to be defined in the same way across different universes will not satisfy our precise version of 21 As we noted, the proposal that Same = Perm + Ext is equivalent. We can also formulate the proposal more succinctly: say that an n-ary operation O across domains of relational type is closed under injections if for all M , all relations R i over M of suitable type, and all injections π from M to M ,
It is easy to check that Inj ≡ Isom + Ext. However, the ideas behind Isom and Ext are quite different, so they might as well be kept separate.
Same. But we we found reasons to believe that this is inevitable. What matters instead is whether the proposal has unacceptable consequences for familiar operations. Since sameness is not closed under definability anyway, we may be satisfied if these familar operations are definable (in some suitable sense) from Same operations. This seems indeed to hold in most cases. In particular, as regards the quantifiers in mathematical logic we looked at, all of them are Isom and many are Ext, and most of the non-Ext ones are either definable from Ext quantifiers, or can be replaced without loss by their Ext versions (their relativizations). This is even clearer for natural language quantifiers: the only non-Ext ones that occur seem to be obtained from Ext quantifiers (such as determiner denotations) and the unary (and Isom and Ext) predicate thing. On the other hand, many noun phrase denotations and some determiner denotations are not Isom. Examples of latter are possessives like Mary's or most students'. But it seems correct to say in these cases that, as determiner denotations, these are indeed not Same. The (standard) truth conditions for Q students' A are B are
where R is a possessive relation and R a = {b : R(a, b)}. 22 If we, as is reasonable, take Q = Poss(Q, [[student]], R) to be the denotation of Q students', then Q is Ext (provided Q is Conserv and Ext), but not Isom (even if Q is). As long as [[student] ] and R are fixed, Poss(Q, [[student]], R) is not the same across different domains. But if they are taken as variable arguments, we obtain an Isom and Ext type 1, 2, 1, 1 quantifier Q defined by Q (C, R, A, B) ⇔ Poss(Q, C, R)(A, B).
It could perhaps be argued that the type 1 Rescher quantifier Q R and the Chang quantifier Q C , which are Isom but not Ext and do not relativize, are particularly problematic cases for our proposal, since the intuition that these are the same on each domain may seem quite strong. These quantifiers have somewhat different logical properties than their relativizations, not with respect to compactness but with respect to being able to characterize the natural number ordering. So we cannot always use the relativizations instead.
Note that Q R and Q C are monotone increasing type 1 quantifiers, in the sense that (Q R ) M (A) and A ⊆ A ⊆ M implies (Q R ) M (A ), and similarly for Q C . For these quantifiers, we can, if we want, (under a few extra assumptions) replace Ext by a weaker requirement of sameness.
Smooth quantifiers
Consider Isom and monotone increasing type 1 quantifiers over finite universes. (This reduces Q C to the universal quantifier.) For these, we know exactly which ones relativize:
Proposition 3 (Westerståhl (1991) , Kolaitis and Väänänen (1995) ) A quantifier of the above kind relativizes if and only if it is first-order definable.
Also, we know exactly which ones are Ext. The following is easy to show with standard methods from e.g. van Benthem (1984) or Peters and Westerståhl (2006) .
Proposition 4
A quantifier of the above kind is Ext if and only if it is either the trivial quantifier 0 or ∃ ≥k for some k ≥ 0.
There are uncountably many non-first-order definable, and hence non-Ext, quantifiers of this kind. Is there a reasonable Carnapian explication of which of these nonetheless 'behave the same' on all (finite) universes?
Such a property has in fact been discussed in the literature. The idea is that when the universe is extended with just one new element, the behavior must not change too much. More precisely, since Q is monotone increasing and Isom, for each M there is a minimum size m, depending only on |M |, such that Q M (A) ⇔ |A| ≥ m. Thus Q is determined by a function f : N → N such that f (n) ≤ n + 1; we let f (|M |) = n + 1 when Q M = ∅. Now, the requirement on Q, i.e. on f , is that for all n, f (n) ≤ f (n + 1) ≤ f (n) + 1. In other words, when one element is added to M , the minimum size either stays the same or increases with 1.
This property was called smoothness in Väänänen and Westerståhl (2002) , who showed that smooth quantifiers are well-behaved in various logical ways, but it was already introduced (under different names) in van Benthem (1984, 1986) , where one idea was that smooth quantifiers have a particularly uniform behavior that might be a reason to classify them as logical. My point here is that smoothness seems a quite reasonable requirement of sameness across different universes. When a new element is added, the quantifier is not required to stay exactly the same -that only holds, among the quantifiers discussed here, for 0 and ∃ ≥k -but it is allowed to change 'as little as possible' (as much as the universes changes).
We can now check that Q R = test1 from section 7 is indeed smooth, as is ∀, whereas test2 and ∀even are not: the minimum level of test2 jumps two steps when we go, for example, from a universe with 2k −1 elements to one with 2k elements. Similarly, the level for ∀even jumps two steps from a universe with 2k elements to one with 2k+1 elements. 23 Thus, if desired, we may use a different stipulation of the Same property for this particular class of quantifiers: Isom + Smooth, instead of the much more restrictive Isom + Ext. However, there seems to be no way to extend this idea to quantifiers of arbitrary type.
Conclusion
The main conclusion of our discussion is not really surprising: the idea of being the same operation on different domains is indeed vague, even when we grant -as is motivated by fairly clear examples -that this property is not closed under definability. However, there are strong intuitions about sameness, which can be cashed out in precise constraints. I have focused on two: isomorphism invariance (Isom) and 'extension invariance' (Ext). The seemingly natural idea that the former is necessary and the latter sufficient for sameness cannot be upheld, but I suggested that the conjunction of the two is a fairly successful explication of sameness. It is a stipulation that allows almost all quantifiers used in practice, both in model theory and in natural language semantics, to be definable from Same operations. The stipulation does not conform to every intuition about sameness, but this goal cannot be achieved anyway. I also suggested that, for the special case of monotone type 1 quantifiers over finite domains, the weaker constraint Isom + Smooth does a better job of accounting for sameness intuitions.
The observations in this note were motivated by the identification in Feferman (1999) of sameness across domains as a crucial ingredience in the notion of logical operations. The delineation of logicality is the more important, and more difficult, task. But I do think that the notion of sameness has some independent interest. Also, since (at least in my view) logicality is closed under (suitably specified) definability, we cannot expect sameness to be necessary for logicality. But it seems perfectly feasible to require logical operations of relational type to be definable from Isom and Ext operations. This is manifestly true for generalized quantifiers: Each Isom quantifier is definable from an Isom and Ext quantifier, namely, its relativization.
